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THE PROTECTED STATUS OF OPINION WORK
PRODUCT: A MISCONDUCT EXCEPTION
Andrea L. Borgford
Abstract: Opinion work product generally has remained immune from discovery, although
two increasingly problematic exceptions have developed to counter this immunity. The vague
"at-issue" exception permits discovery of documented mental impressions when those mental
impressions are central to the subject matter of the suit. The overly narrow "crime-fraud"
exception opens opinion work product to discovery when it has been developed in furtherance
of a crime or fraud. Because these redundant yet inadequate exceptions share common
elements and goals, courts should streamline this important area of discovery law by
condensing them into a new misconduct exception.
Federal discovery rules provide a qualified protection to an attorney's
work product.1 Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
("Rules") requires a party to show "substantial need" and "undue
hardship" in order to discover an adversary's material prepared in
anticipation of litigation.2 Although Rule 26(b)(3) also protects an
attorney's mental impressions and conclusions, it is unclear to what
extent it shields such "opinion work product"3 from discovery. Because
opinion work product is the philosophical centerpiece behind the
protection of work product, it has been referred to as "hard-core" work
product.4
Federal courts have set forth a spectrum of safeguards for hard-core
work product, ranging from a partial to an absolute immunity from
discovery. The structure and strength of these protections have changed
with each federal appellate decision evaluating opinion work product.
Recent judicial trends offer far fewer protections to opinion work product
than those enunciated by earlier courts.
1. As used in this Comment, the term "work product" refers to that material, factual or otherwise,
collected by an attorney or agent in anticipation of litigation. See generally 8 CHARLES A. WRIGHT
& ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §§ 2022-2027 (1970 ed. & Revised
Supp. 1992).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
3. "Opinion work product" will refer to work product which reflects an attorney's mental
impressions, strategies, conclusions, evaluations of witness demeanor, opinions as to case strength or
weakness, and legal theories of the case. See 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note I § 2026; see also 4
JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.64 [3.-2] (2d ed. 1991).
4. See Edward H. Cooper, Work Product of the Rulesmakers, 53 MINN. L. REV. 1269, 1283
(1969).
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This Comment will examine the methods and rationales which have
evolved to address opinion work product after the 1970 amendment to
Rule 26(b)(3). Specifically, this Comment will analyze approaches to
the discoverability of opinion work product and suggest a bright-line
synthesis of the exceptions currently threatening to overtake the rule.
Part I examines the history and development of work product and hard-
core work product, or opinion work product, and the exceptions to
opinion work product's general immunity from discovery. Part II
criticizes the exceptions which currently allow discovery of opinion
work product and suggests a "misconduct exception" for the few
situations in which courts should permit discovery.
I. PROTECTING OPINION WORK PRODUCT
In the landmark 1947 case of Hickman v. Taylor,5 the Supreme Court
protected an attorney's case preparation from routine discovery,
enunciating the "work product doctrine."' Later incorporated into Rule
26(b)(3), the work product doctrine limits the process of free discovery
by requiring a party to demonstrate both substantial need for the
documents in question and undue hardship if the request is denied.'
Courts have required an even greater showing to access opinion work
product. Two exceptions, the "at-issue" exception and the "crime-fraud"
exception, have arisen against the backdrop of that general immunity.
A. The Development of and Rationale for the Work Product Doctrine:
Hickman and Rule 26(b)(3)
At common law, an attorney's strategic investment in the compilation
of case materials received virtually absolute protection from discovery.'
Attorneys refined issues by exchanging rebuttals and surrebuttals filled
with ever-narrowing syllogisms, in hopes of arriving at ultimate issues. 9
5. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
6. Id. at 510.
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's note.
8. Chief Judge Cardozo's statement illustrates early attitudes toward discovery of work product:
"[n]o precedent can be found even in civil causes for compelling disclosure, in advance of the trial,
of the office notes or memoranda prepared by an attorney after consultation with his witnesses, and
summarizing his understanding of the testimony that is likely or expected." People ex rel. Lemon v.
Supreme Court, 156 N.E. 84, 85 (N.Y. 1927), overruled on other grounds by Morgenthau v.
Erlbaum, 451 N.E. 2d 150 (1981).
9. See 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 1202 (discussing formulation of issues through
pleading process before advent of Federal Rules).
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This lengthy process rewarded surprise and secrecy, and encouraged the
"sporting theory of justice."' 0  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
strove to eliminate many of those more dilatory approaches and replace
them with streamlined procedures." Perhaps nowhere was this evolution
so drastic as in the law of discovery.'2 Because the Rules contained no
provision explicitly protecting work product," courts reached conflicting
decisions regarding the discovery of materials prepared by an advocate in
anticipation of litigation.
Shortly after the Supreme Court rejected an amendment to Rule 30(b)
which would have barred any discovery of opinion work product, 4 the
Court decided Hickman v. Taylor.5 Hickman's unique facts provided the
Court with an opportunity to guide lower federal courts on the scope of
10. See 8 id. § 2001 n.20 (1992 Revised Supp.).
11. See generally 8 id. § 2001, at 15 (1970 ed.). Federal discovery procedures have three
purposes:
[First,] to narrow the issues, in order that at the trial it may be necessary to produce evidence
only on a residue of matters that are found to be actually disputed and controverted ....
[Second, tjo obtain evidence for use at the trial .... [Third, tjo secure information about the
existence of evidence that may be used at the trial and to ascertain how and from whom it may
be procured ....
8 id. § 2001.
12. See 8 id. § 2001-2003. These early discovery procedures were codified at Rules 26 through
37, each rule outlining a specific procedure.
13. It was not until 1970 that Rule 26(b)(3) was amended to include protections for work product.
Although the pre-1970 Rule 26(b)(3) addressed the scope of depositions, rather than the general
scope of discovery, the advisory committee reorganized and broadened the discovery rules to include
protections for work product in 1970. See 48 F.R.D. 487 (1970).
14. The advisory committee proposed this amendment to Rule 30(b) in 1946:
The court shall not order the production or inspection of any writing obtained or prepared by
the adverse party, his attorney, surety, indemnitor, or agent in anticipation of litigation or in
preparation for trial unless satisfied that denial of production or inspection will unfairly
prejudice the party seeking the production or inspection in preparing his claim or defense or will
cause him undue hardship or injustice. The court shall not order the production or inspection of
any part of the writing that reflects an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or
legal theories or, except as provided in Rule 35, the conclusions of an expert.
Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Report of Proposed Amendments to Rules
of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 5 F.R.D. 433, 456-57 (1946).
15. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). One commentator suggests that the Court preferred to address the
discovery of work product (and opinion work product) through evolving case law rather than strict
rule. Charles R. Taine, Discovery of Trial Preparations in the Federal Courts, 50 COLUM. L. REV.
1026, 1031 (1950), cited in 8 VRIGT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 2021 n.75. Likewise, the advisory
committee has commented that "[in deciding the Hiclnan case, the Supreme Court appears to have
expressed a preference in 1947 for an approach to the problem of trial preparation materials by
judicial decision rather than by rule." FED. I CtV. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's note.
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protection afforded an adversary's case preparation materials. 16  After
determining that attorney-client privilege did not protect the materials
compiled by defendants' attorney, the Supreme Court nonetheless
forbade their discovery because no necessity or justification supported
such an arbitrary incursion into attorney files.17
The Court determined that an adversary must satisfy two conditions to
gain production of documents prepared in anticipation of litigation.
First, a party must show substantial "necessity" for the contested
documents. 8 Second, a party must demonstrate that denial of production
would cause undue "hardship" or injustice. 9
In the same protective fashion, the Court strongly disapproved of
production of mental impressions,20 differentiating between work product
containing mental impressions and other more factual work product.2 '
The Court implied that opinion work product might never be subject to
discovery.' This important distinction later was incorporated into Rule
26(b)(3).'
Relying on the reasoning in Hicknan, the present Rule 26(b)(3)
operates to limit liberal discovery so that parties do not simply engage in
"fishing expeditions," appropriating an adversary's output and labor.24
While other discovery rules seek to maximize free access to
16. In Hickanan, owners of a sunken tug retained a law firm to represent them in the event of
litigation. Their attorney took statements from survivors who additionally testified to the facts of the
accident in a recorded public hearing. Hickman's administrator brought suit against the tug owners
several months later. Hickanan, 329 U.S. at 498-99. During the discovery process, the plaintiff
requested that the defendants produce any oral or written statements taken from surviving witnesses
of the maritime accident. The defendants' attorney refused to disclose any such documents or oral
statements, contending that attorney-client privilege prohibited discovery. Id. at 499-500.
17. The Court stated that the discovery request was "an attempt, without purported necessity or
justification" to obtain written materials prepared "by an adverse party's counsel in the course of his
legal duties." Id. at 510.
18. Id. at 509-10.
19. Id.
20. The witnesses' oral statements would have implicated counsel's mental impressions because
counsel would have had to remember and relate them. Justice Murphy firmly declared that "we do
not believe that any showing of necessity can be made under the circumstances of this case so as to
justify production" of those mental impressions. Id. at 512.
21. See id. Additionally, the court implied that factual work product is discoverable only when it
is central to the suit. Where work product "is essential to the preparation of [an adversary's] case,
discovery may properly be had." Id. at 511.
22. See id.
23. FED. R. CIr. P. 26(b)(3).
24. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507. See 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 2022; see also FED. R.
CIV. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's note (adopting Hickman test for sfu)stantial need and undue
hardship, and thereby impliedly incorporating Hickman's adversarial rationale).
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information,25 Rule 26(b)(3) limits access to information embodied in
opinions. The Hickman Court sought to reconcile the dueling purposes
of liberal discovery and the adversarial system it serves by setting forth
strong procedural barriers to the disclosure of an attorney's case
preparations and strategies.26 Seeking to protect an attorney's physical
and intellectual property,27 the duty of loyalty to clients, and the
underpinnings of the adversarial process, 28 the Court articulated a
qualified immunity for work product.29 Yet, the Court simultaneously
sought to maximize the judicial economy and free access to information
intended by the Rules.3"
The Supreme Court subsequently authorized amendment of Rule
26(b)(3) in 1970 to clarify and standardize protections for the work
product of lawyers and non-lawyers alike.31 The amended Rule 26(b)(3)
replicated the Hicknan Court's standard of substantial need and undue
hardship.32 Rule 26(b)(3) and case law since have clarified guidelines for
25. For example, Rule 33 allows a party access to information through interrogatories. For a
discussion of the difference between attorney conclusions accessible through interrogatories and
those mental impressions generally inaccessible to discovery, see 4 MOORE, supra note 3, 26.64
and see generally 4A id. 33.
26. For a discussion of these diverging purposes, see the dialogue begun by Elizabeth G.
Thornburg in Rethinking Work Product, 77 VA. L. REV. 1515 (1991) (arguing for abrogation of all
work product immunity), the response it provoked in Ronald J. Allen, Work Product Revisited: A
Comment on Rethinking Work Product, 78 VA. L. REV. 949 (1992), and Professor Thornburgh's
rebuttal in Work Product Rejected: A Reply to Professor Allen, 78 VA. L. REV. 957 (1992). This
dialogue centers around the underpinnings of the work product doctrine viewed through an
economic analysis. See also Robert F. Kane, The Work-Product Doctrine-Cornerstone of the
Adversary System, 31 INS. COUNSEL J. 130 (1964) (describing how the work product doctrine
safeguards the adversary system); D. Christopher Wells, The Attorney Work Product Doctrine and
Carry-Over Immunity: An Assessment of Their Justifications, 47 U. PI=T. L. REV. 675 (1986).
27. See Mervin v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 591 F.2d 821, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating that
Hicknan sought to protect an attorney's consideration and weighing of the facts); see generally
Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of
Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309 (1981) (discussing attorney proprietary interests in work
product).
28. Accord United States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(noting that work product privileges exist to protect the adversary system, not to protect confidential
relationships).
29. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
30. Id. at 501.
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). Prior to 1970, courts offered varying protections for statements
taken by claim adjusters, investigators, and even attorneys. See Cooper, supra note 4 (discussing the
evolution of the work product doctrine between 1947 and 1970).
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's note.
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discovery of factual work product.33  The extent of protections
nonetheless remains unclear for work product containing opinions,
strategies, and other mental impressions.
B. The Uncertain Evolution of Protections for Opinion Work Product
Hard-core work product has generated a continuing series of decisions
questioning its protected status under Rule 26(b)(3). The Rule states
emphatically that "the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories" of lawyers or their
representatives.34  Nonetheless, courts have stumbled over whether a
party must demonstrate a greater showing of need and undue hardship
than that required by factual work product,3" or whether attorney
opinions are discoverable at all.36
The Supreme Court clarified that mental impressions must receive
greater protection than ordinary factual work product in Upjohn Co. v.
United States. 7 In keeping with the Rule's ambiguities, however, the
Court failed to provide clear guidelines regarding what showing of
necessity or hardship justifies access to an adversary's opinion work
33. See generally 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 2022. Although Rule 26(b)(3) applies
only to documents and other tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation, courts protect
attorney work product in any form. See Shelton v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323, 1327-30
(8th Cir. 1986) (protecting attorney mental impressions as work product where they were sought
from attorney himself through deposition, rather than discovery of a document); see also Buford v.
Holladay, 133 F.LD. 487, 492 (S.D. Miss. 1990) (holding that opinion work product is protected
regardless of form, whether documented or oral). Since 1970, courts have added to the basic
principles enunciated in Hickman and Rule 26(b)(3), clarifying, for example, when work product
from terminated litigation can be discovered in subsequent litigation. See generally Caroline T.
Mitchell, Note, The Work Product Doctrine in Subsequent Litigation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 412
(1983).
34. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
35. Traditionally, courts provided at least the same protections to opinion work product as to
standard factual work product, although before Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400-01
(1981), some courts gave opinion work product no additional, special protection. See, e.g., Donovan
v. Fitzsimmons, 90 F.R.D. 583, 588 (N.D. 111. 1981) (holding that movant need only show
substantial need and undue hardship to view opponent's opinion work product); see also United
States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 1038, 1041 (7th Cir. 1973) (holding that movant need only show "good
cause" to obtain discovery of opinion work product).
36. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730 (4th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 977 (1975).
37. 449 U.S. at 401 (1981). The Court classified an attorney's memoranda of a witness's oral
statements as undiscoverable opinion work product, underscoring the protected status of opinion




product.38 Not surprisingly, at least two broad approaches to opinion
work product have evolved since the enactment of Rule 26(b)(3) and the
subsequent Upjohn decision.39 Some courts have protected opinion work
product absolutely. Other courts recognize exceptions in limited or
extraordinary circumstances. The crime-fraud exception opens opinion
work product to discovery when it has been created in furtherance of a
crime or fraud. Likewise, the at-issue exception grants discovery of
documented mental impressions when those impressions become facts
central to the suit.
1. Absolute Immunity
Early after the 1970 amendment to Rule 26, the Fourth Circuit in
Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz0 addressed the
Rule's inherent ambiguities by absolutely protecting all opinion work
product.4 Relying on the imperative language in Rule 26(b)(3) stating
that courts "shall" protect opinion work product,42 the Duplan court
concluded that no showing of substantial need or inability to obtain
elsewhere without undue hardship could justify mandating an attorney to
turn over her or his thoughts to opposing counsel.43 The court reasoned
that if such opinion work product were not protected, attorneys simply
would fail to record important thoughts in writing, thereby impairing the
representation of clients and weakening the adversary system.' To avoid
38. Id. at 401.
39. Other courts have employed haphazard approaches unattached to any particular precedent. As
an example of one such perplexing approach, a court stated that the discovery of "non-mental"
impressions would be permissible. Board of Trustees v. Coulter Corp., 118 F.R.D. 532, 534 (S.D.
Fla. 1987). A third but little-used approach applies a balancing test to determine the protection
mental impressions should receive. International Tel. and Tel. Co. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177
(M.D. Fla. 1973); see Note, Protection of Opinion Work Product Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 64 VA. L. REV. 333, 344-45 (1978) (discussing and criticizing this arcane balancing
test).
40. 509 F.2d 730, 735 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 977 (1975) [hereinafter Duplan].
41. Courts have criticized this approach in situations where fact and opinion are intertwined. See
Bio-Rad Lab. v. Pharmacia, Inc., 130 F.R.D. 116, 122-23 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (allowing discovery
where counsel stated that subject matter and mental impressions were inextricably intertwined).
42. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
43. Duplan, 509 F.2d at 735-36; accord Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 979 F.2d 332,
355-56 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting without discussion that opinion work product is absolutely immune
from discovery).
44. Duplan, 509 F.2d at 735 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1946)).
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this outcome, the Duplan court protected opinion work product
absolutely."
2. Limited Discovery of Opinion Work Product: The At-Issue and
Crime-Fraud Exceptions
Other courts backed away from Duplan's absolute protection and
allowed discovery of mental impressions in limited or exceptional
circumstances.46 These courts created two exceptions to the rule of
absolute immunity. Courts allowed discovery of mental impressions
central to the subject matter of the suit under an at-issue exception to the
protected status of opinion work product. Additionally, courts
enunciated a crime-fraud exception, permitting discovery of opinion
work product created in furtherance of a crime or fraud. The at-issue and
crime-fraud exceptions separately address the circumstance where one
party exclusively controls mental impressions that have become facts
constituting elements of a cause of action.
a. The At-Issue Exception
Opinions may be discoverable if the party resisting discovery has put
mental impressions at issue in a suit.47 For example, a moving party
might discover documents48 containing an attorney's advice when an
adversary claims she relied on that counsel's advice as a reason for
delaying bringing suit.49 A party may also discover mental impressions
when an attorney's opinions on the merits of a patent become the subject
45. Id. at 736.
46. Few appellate decisions exist which discuss opinion work product. District courts have
enunciated most of the law of discovery, often in unpublished opinions.
47. See, e.g., Bird v. Penn Cent Co., 61 F.RD. 43, 47 (E.D. Penn. 1973). Professor Moore states
that "[w]hile Rule 26(b)(3) provides that protection against discovery of the attorney's or
representative's 'mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories' shall be provided,
such protection would not screen information directly at issue." 4 MOORE, supra note 3, 26.64[3.-
2] (emphasis added).
48. The court fast must assess whether documents are protected as work product, however. See
generally Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 979 F.2d 332, 355-56 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that
court's first step must be to determine whether documents were created in anticipation of litigation).
Documents or tangible things must be prepared in anticipation of litigation by an attorney or other
representative to qualify for even the limited protection offered by the work product doctrine. FED.
R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
49. See, e.g., Bird, 61 F.R.D. at 47.
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matter of a second suit.50 Compelling need for the documents must be
demonstrated to the court.5'
The rationale for the at-issue exception developed from waiver
principles similar to those principles debated by courts addressing the
implications of disclosure of work product to experts.52 Under that
rationale, a party waives certain privacy interests by bringing suit
because underlying facts must be available to an adversary. In effect, the
at-issue exception evolved from evidentiary rules 3 prohibiting a party
from affirmatively pleading reliance on attorney advice as a defense, yet
refusing to disclose that advice. For example, courts held that one
relying on attorney advice as an element of a claim or defense, and
thereby putting it at issue, had waived the amorphous privileges and
immunities surrounding that advice. 4 Accordingly, Federal Rule of
Evidence 612 states that documents employed to refresh a witness's
memory consequently become available to an adversary.5 Some courts
have dismissed the contention that Rule 612 operates to lift the shields
against discovery of mental impressions.5 6 In the same vein, courts
generally have rejected the assertion that attorneys waive hard-core work
product protections when documents containing mental impressions are
shown to expert witnesses," although several courts have held
otherwise.58
50. See, e.g., Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
51. See, e.g., Holmgren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1992).
52. See North Carolina Elec. Membership v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 108 F.R.D. 283
(M.D.N.C. 1985) (holding that opinion work product is absolutely privileged from discovery, even
where shown to an expert witness); James Julian, Inc., v. Raytheon Co., 93 F.R.D. 138 (D. Del.
1982); Berkey Photo, Inc., v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see also
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that a party does not waive hard-
core work product protections when mental impressions are given to an expert witness); Hamel v.
General Motors Corp., 128 F.R.D. 281 (D. Kan. 1989).
53. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 612.
54. See supra notes 47, 52.
55. FED. R. EVID. 612. See generally Megan McCrea, Note, Disclosure of Attorney Work Product
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 612: An Abrogation of Work Product Protection?, 59 TEMPLE L.Q.
1043 (1986).
56. See, e.g., Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312 (3d Cir.) (holding that Rule 612 never allows discovery
of those attorney mental impressions implicated in the selection of documents with which an
attorney has refreshed a deponent's memory), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985).
57. See supra note 52.
58. See, e.g., Occulto v. Adamar, 125 F.R.D. 611 (D.N.J. 1989) (allowing discovery of attorney
opinion work product where attorney apparently wrote every word of expert's report); see also Note,
Interactions Between Memory Refreshment Doctrine and Work Product Protection Under the
Federal Rules, 88 YALE L.L 390,404-06 (1978).
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The Ninth Circuit recently expanded the at-issue exception further,
permitting it to be employed affirmatively as a sword. In the recent case
of Holmgren v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,59
the court applied the at-issue exception to bad-faith insurance settlement
litigation." Holmgren, a party injured by State Farm's insured, sued
State Farm under Montana law. She claimed that State Farm had
handled her settlement in bad faith." She sought and gained discovery
of in-house memoranda in which an adjuster admitted that State Farm's
insured had caused a specified, extensive amount of monetary damages. 62
After State Farm settled for far below this amount, Holngren instituted a
bad-faith settlement suit.63
The Holmgren court specifically rejected the policy of absolute
immunity set forth in Duplan.4 The court held that opinion work
product may be discovered when it satisfies two conditions. First, the
documented mental impressions must be at issue, or central to the subject
matter under dispute.65 Second, the party must show compelling need for
those documented opinions.66 The panel described this showing to be
"beyond the substantial need/undue hardship test required under Rule
26(b)(3) for non-opinion work product."'67 Though noting that opinion
work product deserves special protection, the Holmgren court, like many
other courts, defined those protections in terms of exceptions to the rule
of immunity.
61
b. The Crime-Fraud Exception
The crime-fraud exception69 is narrower in scope than the at-issue
exception. To access opinion work product using the crime-fraud
59. 976 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1992).
60. Id. at 577.
61. Id. at 575.
62. Id. at 576.
63. Id.




68. Id. at 577-78. See, e.g., Truck Ins. Exch. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 66 F.R.D. 129
(E.D. Pa. 1975) (disagreeing with absolute immunity provided by Dupian court and describing
protections afforded opinion work product in terms of case-by-case exceptions to immunity).
69. The crime-fraud exception has been used primarily, though not exclusively, in grand jury
settings. See In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1080 (4th Cir. 1981) (utilizing crime-fraud exception to
provide discovery of opinion work product before grand jury), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982);
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exception, a party must make a prima facie demonstration that the
adversary created the documents in furtherance of a crime or fraud.7"
Additionally, as the Eighth Circuit decision In re Murphy noted, the
moving party must show that the documents in question bear a close
relationship to the fraud or crime.71 Essentially, therefore, the movant
must make the type of showing necessary under the at-issue exception in
addition to a showing of crime or fraud.72 A movant thus must show
more than compelling need and unavailability elsewhere to discover
opinion work product through the narrow aperture provided by the
crime-fraud exception. 3
Like the at-issue exception to opinion work product immunity, the
crime-fraud exception developed from principles of waiver.74 As officers
of the court,75 attorneys waive any interest in the confidentiality of
documents containing their mental impressions when those documents
are used in the commission or contemplation of a crime or fraud.76 When
see also In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that attorney's innocence would
not prevent discovery of opinion work product created, unknowingly, in furtherance of client's
crime). But see In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury (1), 640 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding
that attorney's mental impressions would remain undiscoverable to avoid invasion of privacy, but
remanded to district court to determine whether extraordinary need existed). In general, although the
work product doctrine applies to grand jury proceedings, it may carry fewer protections because of
the grand jury's "authority and need to accomplish its investigatorial duty." In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 73 F.R.D. 647, 653 (M.D. Fla. 1977); see also In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 n.19
(8th Cir. 1977).
70. See, e.g., In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073; Lemelson v. Bendix Corp., 104 F.R.D. 13, 16-17 (D. Del.
1984).
71. In re Murphy, 560F.2dat 338.
72. Id. See also infra Section II(B).
73. In re Doe, 662 F.2d at 1080 (stating that "not only must the government make a prima facie
showing of fraud, but must show a greater need for the opinion work product material than was
necessary in order to obtain the fact work product material").
74. See In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury (H), 640 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1980). A crime-fraud
exception to attorney-client privilege developed from similar principles. For a discussion of
attorney-client privilege in this context, see Earl J. Silbert, The Crime-Fraud Exception to the
Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine, the Lawyer's Obligations of Disclosure, and
the Lawyer's Response to Accusation of Wrongful Conduct, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 351 (1986).
75. Hickman underscored the tension between an attorney's diverging loyalties to the client, to the
court, and to her or his own privacy. Justice Murphy noted that:
[h]istorically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to work for the advancement of
justice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his clients. In performing his various
duties, however, it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from
unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510 (1947).
76. See In re Doe, 662 F.2d at 1079.
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opinion work product shields such behavior from discovery, it becomes a
fraud upon the court;77 courts have refused to allow attorneys to profit
from the fortuitous concealment of their crimes by the work product
doctrine.78  Thus, the crime-fraud exception bolsters the adversarial
process by encouraging fair but limited access to hard-core work
product.
c. Other Approaches to Opinion Work Product
In addition to the crime-fraud and at-issue exceptions, applicable in
exceptional circumstances, courts have created uniqae procedural and
substantive methods for addressing the discoverability of mental
impressions.79  For example, consistent with advisory committee
recommendations," courts have viewed opinion work product in camera
and ordered the abstraction of documents containing opinion work
product." Courts have ordered opinions, mental impressions and
conclusions stricken from produced documents.82  Somewhat
inconsistently, other courts have permitted discovery of mental
impressions and conclusions by labelling them work product rather than
opinion work product,83 or by removing them from the confines of the
work product doctrine altogether.84
77. Id.
78. At the district court level, one court has enunciated an indistinct balancing test. International
Tel. and Tel. Co. v. United Tel. Co. of Fla., 60 F.R.D. 177 (M.D. Fla. 1973). This test has been
criticized for its general uncertainty and its discretionary nature, unsupported in the language of
Hickman v. Taylor. See Note, Protection of Opinion Work Product Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 64 VA. L. REV. 333, 344-45 (1978).
79. See supra note 78.
80. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's note.
81. See, e.g., Joyner v. Continental Ins. Co., 101 F.R.D. 414 (S.D. Ga. 1983).
82. See, e.g., Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 595-96 (3d Cir. 1984). For the
suggestions of the advisory committee regarding partial disclosure of documents, see FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(3) advisory committee's note. Additionally, reminiscent of pre-iiclanan holdings, some
courts have prohibited discovery of relevant opinion work product where such material would be
neither admissible at trial, nor reasonably calculated to lead to admissible material. See, e.g.,
Smedley v. Travelers Ins. Co., 53 F.R.D. 591, 594 (D.N.H. 1971).
83. See In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1018-21 (1st Cir. 1988)
(holding, contrary to the Eighth and Third Circuits, that attorney selection of documents is ordinary
work product rather than opinion work product).
84. See, e.g., Snowden v. Connaught Lab., Inc. 137 F.R.D. 325,332 (D. Kan. 1991) (holding that
attorney mental impressions fall outside work product protections where they appear in documents
filed with the court).
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These approaches exemplify the diverging procedural and substantive
remedies to the problems posed by hard-core work product. While most
courts carefully note that opinion work product deserves some type of
special protection from discovery, the decisional lines between work
product and opinion work product merge.
II. REDEFINING THE OPINION WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE:
A MISCONDUCT EXCEPTION
Because absolute immunity has not proven functional, courts must
offer some sort of exception to opinion work product's immunity. The
at-issue and crime-fraud exceptions, however, encourage a perplexing
view of opinion work product. Each exception contains elements
common to the other, although neither exception alone sufficiently
addresses the needs of parties seeking or defending against discovery. A
misconduct exception incorporating the elements of each rule would
lessen redundancy and clarify the dimensions of opinion work product.
This misconduct exception should require movants to demonstrate
compelling need for the opinion work product, and to make a prima facie
demonstration of crime, fraud, misrepresentation, bad faith or other
misconduct as a threshold showing, after which a judicial examination in
camera may begin.
A. Opinion Work Product Should Not Be Absolutely Immune from
Discovery.
An uncertain and changing standard may cause attorneys to set fewer
sensitive issues in writing as they struggle with the reliability of
protections for their memoranda and thoughts.86 Courts should articulate
a single, clear standard governing the discovery of opinion work product.
Although a rule of absolute, exceptionless immunity theoretically might
inspire uniform decisions on opinion work product, that rule has failed to
meet the needs of attorneys or the judicial system, neither serving the
goals of Hicknan v. Taylor nor maintaining the adversarial process.
85. State courts also have refused to follow a blanket standard of absolute immunity from
discovery. For example, the Arizona Supreme Court determined that discovery of mental
impressions could be had in subsequent litigation where they were at issue, though discovery of
opinion work product in present litigation was prohibited. Brown v. Superior Court, 670 P.2d 725,
735 n.8 (Ariz. 1983), vacated inpart, Gosewich v. American Honda, 737 P.2d 376 (Ariz. 1987).
86. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947) (discussing dangers of broad discovery of
mental impressions).
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Although Hickman offers strong protections for an attorney's routine
strategies, impressions, and case preparation methods, it implies that
where those impressions are probative evidence in a suit, they may be
subject to discovery." The Supreme Court noted that denying discovery
to plaintiff Hickman would not hide material, non-privileged facts
essential to the preparation of his case.8 Implying that some instances
might justify the production of mental impressions, Justice Jackson in his
concurring opinion stated that actual evidence should be subject to
discovery. 9 Similarly, the Supreme Court declined in Upjohn Co. to
extend absolute protection to opinion work product.90
Thus, while courts that have recognized an absolute immunity argue
that anything less would undermine the adversary system and prove
inconsistent with the work product doctrine,9' problems remain with such
an absolute bar. Courts and commentators have criticized Duplan's
absolute bar on the discovery of mental impressions because it leads to
harsh results where fact and opinion are intertwined.92 Duplan's
precedential value has diminished even in the Fourth Circuit, as
inconsistent decisions have adopted various exceptions without explicitly
overruling Duplan 's absolute bar.9'
87. Id.
88. Id. at 511-13. The Court noted that "[i]f there should be a rare situation justifying production
of these matters (oral statements implicating mental impressions), petitioner's case is not of that
type." Id. at 513.
89. Id. at 515 (Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that "[iut seems clear and long has been recognized
that discovery should provide a party access to anything that is evidence in his case." (emphasis
added)).
90. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 401-02 (1981) (commenting that the Court was
"not prepared.., to say that such [opinion work product] material is always protected by the work-
product rule').
91. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., Holmgren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1992);
Comment, Protection of Opinion Work Product under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 64 VA.
L. REV. 333, 337-38 (1978).
93. See Charlotte Motor Speedway, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 125 F.R.D. 127, 130 (M.D.N.C.
1989) (distinguishing Duplan and applying at-issue exception to permit production of opinion work
product for in camera review because activities of counsel were "inextricably interwoven" with
subject matter of suit); In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1079 (4th Cir. 1981) (adopting crime-fraud
exception in Fourth Circuit for grand jury proceedings), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); Duplan
Corp. v. Deering Milliken, 540 F.2d 1215, 1220 (4th Cir. 1976) (Duplan I1) (reserving question of
whether a crime-fraud exception might exist to opinion work product immunity). But see Sandberg
v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 979 F.2d 332, 355-56 (4th Cir. 1992) (reiterating absolute immunity);
c.f. In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1988) (refusing to extend subject-matter
waiver to opinion work product), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1011 (1989).
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Courts similarly have misread Rule 26(b)(3) to bar all discovery of
opinion work product.94 Neither the Rule nor the advisory committee's
notes require a blanket protection of all opinion work product. While the
notes and Rule, when read together, mandate a court to steadfastly and
consistently protect hard-core work product,9" the committee
acknowledged that a court might be forced to disclose a document after
deleting some parts containing mental impressions.96 Moreover, neither
the Rule nor the notes address the situation in which those mental
impressions are operative facts in a fraud, crime, or misconduct-oriented
suit. Finally, Rule 26(b)(3) employs affirmative rather than negative
language to protect opinion work product. The Rule states that courts
"shall protect" opinions,97 rather than stating that courts "shall not" order
discovery of mental impressions, a far more restrictive measure. Rule
26(b)(3) therefore does not prevent all discovery of opinion work
product.
B. The At-Issue and Crime-Fraud Exceptions Fail To Protect Opinion
Work Product Appropriately
The crime-fraud and at-issue exceptions fail to address adequately the
spectrum of possibilities for discovery of opinion work product. Neither
exception operating independently would meet the needs of the judicial
system. Yet, in conjunction, the repetitive exceptions easily promote
confusion. Courts apply the at-issue and crime-fraud exceptions to guard
against the same types of behavior. While the at-issue exception does
not state misconduct as an element, in practice courts permit discovery of
hard-core work product only when misconduct has occurred.98
Additionally, both exceptions operate from a philosophical basis of
waiver. When a party utilizes the discovery system to hide evidence of
attorney or agent wrongdoing committed in anticipation of litigation,
courts consider the party to have waived an interest in the privacy of
94. See, e.g., Duplan, 509 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 977 (1975).
95. See FED. . Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's note (stating that "[the courts have
steadfastly safeguarded against disclosure of lawyers' mental impressions and legal theories, as well
as mental impressions and subjective evaluations of investigators and claim-agents. In enforcing this
provision of the subdivision, the courts will sometimes find it necessary to order disclosure of a
document but with portions deleted").
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. This Comment uses the label "misconduct" to refer to crime, fraud, misrepresentation,
attorney malpractice, and intentional wrongdoing.
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those documents.99 Finally, both exceptions exist simultaneously in
some circuits."° Because both exceptions cover sirailar ground, each
exception becomes less clear, less useful, and less judicially economical.
The crime-fraud exception fails to include certaina forms of severe
misconduct which require proof of attorney mental impressions. For
example, an injured party under the following fact pattern could not
access opinion work product using the crime-fraud exception. Knowing
of a conflict of interest between clients, an attorney nonetheless
represents one client to the disadvantage of the other. The only proof of
the attorney's wrongdoing exists in handwritten memoranda in the
attorney's files. In this case, a plaintiff could not use the crime-fraud
exception to access the opinion work product evidence of bad faith or
malpractice if the misconduct does not constitute criminal or fraudulent
activity. By itself, the crime-fraud exception fails to provide adequately
for discovery of opinion work product when discovery is warranted.
The at-issue exception also fails to meet the needs of the discovery
system, either independently or in conjunction with the crime-fraud
exception. The concrete elements of the at-issue exception do not
explicitly prohibit an offensive strike.1"' This provides a potential
loophole for the invasion of attorney privacy. 102  The exception allows
discovery when a movant can demonstrate that mental impressions are at
issue and the need for the documents containing them is compelling.0 3
On the face of the rule, therefore, a plaintiff in a shareholders' derivative
suit could add opposing corporate counsel as defendant, alleging breach
99. See, e.g., In re Doe, 662 F. 2d 1073, 1078-82 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000
(1982).
100. For example, in the Fourth Circuit both the at-issue and crime-fraud exceptions apparently
exist simultaneously. See In re Doe, 662 F. 2d at 1078-82 (applying crime-fraud exception);
Charlotte Motor Speedway, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 125 F.R.D. 127, 130-31 (M.D.N.C. 1989)
(applying at-issue exception). Notwithstanding the Fourth Circuit's adoption of these exceptions,
the Fourth Circuit recently reiterated the stance that opinion work product enjoys absolute immunity.
See Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 979 F.2d 332, 355-56 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating without
discussion that opinion work product is absolutely immune from discovery). Although the Ninth
Circuit trend is somewhat confusing, the crime-fraud and at-issue exceptions similarly exist side-by-
side. See Holmgren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1992) (adopting
at-issue exception); In re National Mortage Equity Corp. Mortage Pool Certificates Litig., 116
F.R.D. 297, 302 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (limiting application of crime-fraud exception to situations where
attorney knew of or participated in crime or fraud).
101. See Holmgren, 976 F.2d at 577 (setting forth elements of at-issue exeeption).
102. A similar discussion, including practice tips for insurance counsel, appears in Donald H.
Flanary, Jr. et. al., Discovery Pierces Privileges in Coverage and Bad Fcith Actions, 59 DEFENSE
COUNSEL J. 371 (1992).
103. See Holmgren, 976 F.2d at 577.
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of duty of care, and thereby access opinion work product created in
anticipation of that litigation."'°  Read without the gloss of equity, one
party may manipulate the at-issue exception to gain broad discovery of
materials containing an adversary's mental impressions.
Given this broad reading facially provided by the at-issue exception,
the at-issue exception proves inconsistent with the federal policies
enunciated in Hickman v. Taylor.'05 The Hicknan Court sought to guard
attorney mental impressions closely and thereby secure the adversarial
process.05 An exception encouraging anything more than infrequent
discovery of mental impressions directly conflicts with Hicknan's
protective admonitions.0 7 It remains unclear whether a mere allegation
satisfies the requisite showing of compelling need, or whether a movant
must make a prima facie case of compelling need. No court has clarified
"compelling need." The recent Ninth Circuit case of Holmgren found
compelling need when pertinent information was unavailable
elsewhere."' 8 Yet if opposing counsel need only add an allegation of bad
faith to the pleadings to open the door to discovery, attorney thoughts
might be subjected to more frequent search.' °9 Consequently, many
attorneys, agents, sureties, and indemnitors might cease to write down
impressions, as Hicknan warned."0 If allegations of bad faith were to
become routine additions to pleadings,"' the resulting expansion of
discovery might weaken the adversary system which Hickman sought to
104. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 724-26 (N.D. I1. 1978) (failing to
define compelling need, but holding nonetheless that plaintiff shareholders had demonstrated
compelling need for documents containing corporate counsel's advice, a "critical issue" in the suit).
105. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
106. Id. at 511.
107. Id. at 510 (holding that "[n]ot even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify
unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of an attorney.").
108. Holmgren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1992).
109. See Maryland Am. Gen. Ins. Co. v. Blackmon, 639 S.W.2d 455, 457-58 (Tex. 1982)
(holding under Texas discovery rules that a mere allegation of bad faith is insufficient to pierce
discovery protections). The court noted that if a mere allegation were a sufficient showing, every
complaint would as a matter of course contain an allegation of bad faith. Id.
110. 329 U.S. at 511 (stating that because much would remain unwritten, "[inefficiency,
unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the
preparation of cases for trial").
111. If discovery of opinion work product were to become common, attorneys might feel
compelled to seek discovery of opposing counsel's mental impressions to avoid malpractice claims.
Additionally, parties defending against discovery requests reasonably might fear the imposition of
Rule 37 sanctions if their responses were deemed incomplete or evasive. See FED. R. CIv. P. 37.
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uphold."1 The broad at-issue exception fails to provide adequate
protection for opinion work product for these reasons.
Neither the at-issue nor crime-fraud exceptions to the general
immunity of opinion work product individually safeguard attorney
mental impressions adequately, though together they are redundant.
Although courts tend to apply the at-issue exception sparingly,113 its
vagueness lends the exception to undue expansion, while its useful
elements are duplicated in the crime-fraud exception.1 The crime-fraud
exception stops short of allowing discovery of opinion work product
created in furtherance of attorney or agent misconduct. A solution to the
inadequacy and repetitiveness of the exceptions is to consolidate their
elements into a single, clear exception to the immunity afforded mental
impressions.
C. The At-Issue and Crime-Fraud Exceptions Should Be Consolidated
and Narrowed into a Misconduct Exception.
Because a narrow application of the at-issue exception merely mimics
the goals and substantive elements of the crime-fraud exception,"' courts
should condense these two exceptions into one exception that more
consistently serves the purposes of the discover rules. 116  This
misconduct exception should allow dicovery when 1) a prima facie
showing indicates 2) that opinion work product has been created in
furtherance of misconduct, crime, or fraud, and 3) that the movant has
compelling need of the documents.
The misconduct exception should utilize the threshold protections
provided by the crime-fraud exception to safeguard opinion work
product. Before a movant may view opinion work product, courts should
require a prima facie showing of fraud, crime, or misconduct relevant to
the subject matter of the suit. 7 A mere allegation of crime, fraud, or bad
112. In addition, if many parties resisted discovery predicated on the at-issue exception, judicial
resources more often would be spent to oversee discovery. The discovery process, which is oriented
toward self-execution, would then require increasing court involvement in the arena of opinion work
product as parties sought to define their rights. See generally 4 MOORE, supra note 3, 26.
113. See, e.g., Charlotte Motor Speedway, Inc. v. International Ins. Co., 125 F.R.D. 127, 129
(M.D.N.C. 1989) (noting that courts have carved out narrow exceptions from opinion work products
general immunity).
114. See supra note 69 and accompanying text, describing crime-fraud exception.
115. See supra note 69 and accompanying text
116. See supra notes 11 and 26 and accompanying text, describing purposes of discovery rules.
117. C.f. Lemelson v. Bendix Corp., 104 F.R.D. 13, 16-18 (D. Del. 1981,) (discussing application




faith should be insufficient to warrant judicial involvement in the sifting
of opposing counsel's documents."'
Once the court is satisfied with a prima facie showing that these
documented impressions are operative facts in a crime, fraud, or attorney
misconduct action, the court should require a showing of compelling
need for the documents before examining them in camera. Requiring a
movant to demonstrate compelling need both serves the protective
policies enunciated in Hickman and encourages parties rather than judges
to bear the greater burden of solving discovery disputes. The higher
threshold of compelling need ensures that fewer unwarranted discovery
disputes encompass judicial time. After these showings, the court should
examine the documents in camera." 9 Only after such safeguards, and in
limited situations, should courts allow a movant actual discovery of
opinion work product.
The primary advantage to condensing these exceptions rests in the
streamlining effect of consolidation. Because the at-issue and crime-
fraud exceptions serve the same fact-gathering purposes of the discovery
rules, 20 they lose little positive impact through consolidation. When a
documented mental impression or conclusion becomes a fact
demonstrating misconduct, courts allow discovery based on its central
importance to the suit, whether the implement of that discovery is the
crime-fraud exception or the at-issue exception. A misconduct
exception, therefore, builds upon the precedent of the crime-fraud and at-
issue exceptions while providing clearer guidance to parties and courts.
Not only is a clear, narrow standard likely to accurately pinpoint the type
of opinion work product subject to discovery, but a clear standard
maximizes judicial efficiency. Similarly, amending Rule 26(b)(3) to
narrowly incorporate a limited exception to opinion work product
protections might create greater uniformity among circuits. Such an
amendment would not disrupt the case-by-case nature of work product
adjudications, an approach preferred by the Supreme Court in
Hickman.'2 ' Rather, it could provide clearer guidance to judges
118. See supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
119. See In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 n.20 (8th Cir. 1977) (noting that the high level of
immunity enjoyed by opinion work product does not lessen a court's ability to examine such
material in camera). If possible, consistent with the advisory committee's notes to Rule 26(b)(3), the
court should excise the mental impressions, or abstract or redact the documents. However,
abstraction is unlikely to serve any purpose if those impressions are operative facts in a suit.
120. See supra note 11, discussing purposes of discovery rules.
121. See supra note 15.
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examining documents in camera which contain mental impressions and
conclusions.'2
III. CONCLUSION
Courts should consolidate the redundant and confusing at-issue and
crime-fraud exceptions into a new misconduct exception to the immunity
afforded opinion work product. A single misconduct exception better
serves the goals of liberal discovery, yet maintains the adversarial
process. Courts should eliminate the overinclusive at-issue exception
and draw upon the protections provided by the crime-fraud exception to
shape a single, uniform rule governing the discoverability of opinion
work product.
122. Such a rule would fit easily into the model of judicial economy exemplified by Rule 16's
pretrial conferences and the self-executing nature of most of the discovery -ules. When it is clear to
all counsel that a strong preliminary showing of a certain nature must be made before the court may
examine documents containing mental impressions, counsel are less likely to move to compel
discovery of documents containing opinion work product. Attorneys reasonably might fear Rule 11
sanctions if allegations of crime, fraud, or misconduct are determined frivolous. See FED. R. Civ. P.
11.
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